Fuzzy intrusion detection by Dickerson, John Edward





Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dickerson, John Edward, "Fuzzy intrusion detection" (2001). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 17543.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/17543
Fuzzy intrusion detection 
by 
John Edward Dickerson 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Computer Engineering 
Major Professor: James Davis 





Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the Master's thesis of 
John Edward Dickerson 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
ill 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ vi 
ABSTRACT .... .......................................................................................................... vii 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ...................................................................... 5 
Related Research ............. ................................................................................ 5 
The Denning Model ..................................................................................... 5 
Other Models ................................................................................... ............ 8 
IDS Architectures ........................................................................................ 9 
Data Reduction ... .............................................................................. ......... 12 
Data Aggregation ..... .. ............. ............ ........................ ............................... 12 
Data Source Selection ............................................................................... . 13 
Network Data Reduction ..... ....................................................................... 13 
Fuzzy Systems ....................................... .................................. ... .......... ......... 14 
Clustering Techniques for Identifying Rules .. ............................................ 15 
Fuzzy C-Means Clustering ............................................................................. 16 
Visual Data Mining ........................................................................................ 17 
Design Considerations ................................................................................... 18 
Default Criteria .............. ...... .......... ............................................................ 18 
Changes in the Computer Security Landscape ...... ...................................... 19 
SYSTEM DESIGN ....................... ............................................................................ 22 
Design Goals ................................................................................................. 22 
iv 
System Architecture ................................................................................... 22 
The Network Data Collector ...................................................................... 23 
The Network Data Analyzer ......................... ................ .............................. 25 
Data Description ............................................................................................ 26 
Network Data Reduction ............................................................................ 26 
TCP State Monitoring ........... .. ................................................................... 27 
Exceptions to TCP State Processing ........................................................... 28 
Data Selection ............................................................................................ 29 
Network Metrics ........................................................................................ 31 
Fuzzy Systems Development ......................................................................... 35 
Fuzzy Input Value Generation .................................................................... 35 
Fuzzy Output Values .................................................................................. 36 
Creating Fuzzy Rules for Intrusion Detection ............................................. 36 
Data Mining Tools ......................................................................................... 37 
EXPERIMENTS ....................................................................................................... 39 
Methodology ................................................................................................. 39 
The Test Environment ................................................................................... 39 
Attack Phases ................................................................................................ 40 
Attack Scenarios ............................................................................................ 41 
Scenario 1: Host or Port Scanning ............................................................. 41 
Results ....................................................................................................... 51 
Scenario 2: An Portmapper Scan ............................... ................................ 52 
V 
Scenario 3: A UDP Buffer Overflow Attack. ............................................. 52 
Scenario 4: A Ping Flood Attack ................................................................ 55 
Scenario 5: Detecting an Unauthorized _Server ........................................... 57 
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 63 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 66 
Vl 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Jim Davis, for his broad understanding, 
positive encouragement, and helpful suggestions during this research. It was his 
Introduction to Information Security cla.<;s that inspired me to pursue graduate research in 
computer security in the first place. I would also like to give thanks to Dr. Doug 
Jacobson for his vast knowledge of computer security and networking. I greatly valued 
his technical insight on a wide range of topics . I was also very pleased to have had Dr. 
Richard Hindman on my committee because he has helped me to see that computer 
security and productivity should never be in opposition. 
Additional thanks must go to Chris McCoy, the manager of Engineering 
Computing Support Services at Iowa State University, who graciously allowed me time 
off from work when I needed it and was always willing to listen patiently while I ranted 
about computer security. 
Finally, I must give loving thanks to my wife Julie Dickerson and to Stormie. 
Julie, for her valuable insight into fuzzy systems and her unfailing support, and Stormie 
for never letting me forget that home is still the thing that matters most. 
Vil 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the application of fuzzy systems to the problem of network 
intmsion detection. Historically, there have been two primary methods of performing 
intmsion detection: misuse detection and anomaly detection. In misuse detection, a 
database of attack signatures is maintained that match known intmsion activity. While 
misuse detection systems are very effective, they require constant updates to the signature 
database to remain effective or to detect distinctly new attacks. Anomaly detection 
systems attempt to discover suspicious behavior by comparing system activity against 
past usage profiles. In this research, network activity is collected and usage profiles 
established for a variety of metrics. A network data gathering and data analysis tool was 
developed to create the metrics from the network stream. Great care is given to 
identifying the metrics that are most suitable for detecting intrusion activity. Visual data 
mining techniques are used to assess which metrics are most effective at detecting 
different types of attacks. The research confirms that data aggregation and data reduction 
play crucial roles in the formation of the metrics. Once the proper metrics are identified, 
fuzzy rules are constructed for detecting attacks in several categories. The attack 
categories are selected to match the different phases that intruders frequently use when 
attacking a system. A suite of attacks tools is assembled to test the fuzzy rules. The 
research shows that fuzzy rules applied to good metrics can provide an effective means of 
detecting a wide variety of network intrusion activity. This research is being used as a 
proof of concept for the development of system known as the Fuzzy Intrusion 
Recognition Engine (FIRE). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Security of computer systems connected to the Internet has become an 
increasingly important subject as more and more aspects of our daily lives involve online 
computing. The widely publicized distributed denial-of-service attacks against major 
Internet sites in February 2000 showed that our networks and systems are woefully 
vulnerable to attacks. In the aftermath of those attacks, several prominent security 
experts identified intrusion detection as one of several technologies that can contribute to 
overall improvements in system security [CERT, 2000]. This thesis develops a novel 
technique for intrusion detection and tests its performance in real-world scenarios. 
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying computer and network activity 
that can lead to the compromise of a security policy [Amoroso, 1999]. Intrusion 
detection can be performed on a single computer system by inspecting system logs and 
audit trails, or one can place the intrusion detection system on a telecommunications 
network where it can observe the messages sent between machines. In general, there are 
three methodologies for performing intrusion detection: misuse detection, intrusion traps, 
and anomaly detection. 
In misuse detection, comparing input data against known intrusion signatures 
discovers suspicious activity. The data stream, either system logs or network data, is 
compared against a database of known attacks. When a pattern in the input stream 
matches a signature in the database, the system sends an alert to the security 
administrator. Many commercial intrusion detection systems are misuse detection 
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systems. While misuse detection systems are quite effective, they also require continuous 
updates to the security databases to remain effective. In general, they are unable to 
recognize an intrusion unless a pattern exists for it in the signature database. 
Intrusion traps are disguised or modified resources that issue an alarm when an 
intruder uses them. Though highly effective at detecting some types of computer break-
ins, they can require a high degree of customization to prepare and are highly system 
specific [Ranum, 1999]. What security administrators would prefer to have is a detection 
system that can adapt to new types of attacks without extensive modification to the 
underlying threat database or operating environment. 
Anomaly-based intrusion detection seeks to find suspicious activity by comparing 
the current system activity against typical patterns of use. The essence of anomaly 
detection is that an intrusion will leave a trail of unusual activity that, if one knows what 
to look for, will reveal the malicious activity. The goal of most anomaly detection 
systems is to be able to detect new attacks, even when that attack has never been 
observed before [Amoroso, 1999]. Of the three types of intrusion detection, anomaly 
detection has received the greatest amount of research attention since it has the potential 
to solve a much larger type of intrusion detection problems and adapts well to new types 
of attacks. [Crosbie, 1995]. 
It is important to note that, by itself, intrusion detection cannot make a system 
more secure [Crosbie and Spafford, 1995]. Rather, intrusion detection can provide 
notification to a security administrator about the occurrence of an attack, help reveal 
system vulnerabilities, and identify what areas may need increased security protections 
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[Denning, 1987]. A good intrusion detection system can also help a system administrator 
become better informed about the state of the networks and systems they administer. 
Prior researchers in the field have explored numerous methods for anomaly 
detection [Frank, 1994]. One technique that has not been widely explored is the use of 
fuzzy systems. Fuzzy systems use fuzzy logic to express rules in human terms that are 
then transformed into machine-executable rules. An expert analyst can use the often-
imprecise language of experience and intuition when describing the rules relating system 
inputs to outputs. Fuzzy systems can be combined with machine learning algorithms to 
help quantify the rule structures. Fuzzy systems have been applied successfully to a 
variety of pattern recognition and control system applications including speed regulation 
of high-speed trains and signal processing applications [Koska, 1993]. We believe that 
the inherent flexibility of fuzzy systems make them an attractive technology for the 
problem of intrusion detection. 
One technology that has received some investigation for intrusion detection is the 
area of data mining [Lee and Wenke, 1997]. Data mining is the process of looking for 
hidden patterns and relationships in data [Schearing, 1997]. This technology has been 
applied successfully to a wide variety of data analysis problems, including health-care 
cost predictions, and automotive sales forecasting. Visual data mining is the technique of 
displaying multivariate input data sets in order to visualize the relationships that exist in 
data [Buja and Cook, 1996]. We believe that visual data mining can provide valuable 
insight into which data parameters are the most effective measures of data anomalies. 
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This research addressed by this thesis serves as a proof-of-concept for a system 
being developed at Iowa State University called the Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine 
(FIRE). Thi5 goal of the FIRE project is to develop an easy -to-deploy anomaly 
detection system that uses fuzzy systems in the intrusion assessment engine. 
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BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Related Research 
The Denning Model 
Research into intrusion detection is not new. Investigators have been exploring 
the field in earnest for several years [Frank, 1994]. In [Denning, 1987], Dorothy 
Denning made an invaluable contribution to the field of intrusion detection by defining 
the fundamental framework for describing all intrusion detection systems. Denning 
developed a model that shows that nearly all anomaly detection systems can be 
characterized as rule-based pattern matching systems. A depiction of this model is shown 
in Figure 1. In this model, audit trails of network packet data and host-based system logs 
produce all of the input data. The audit trail data are compared against usage activity 
profiles for the data feed. The profiles are derived from statistical metrics or models of 
the data over time. A security operator develops pattern-matching rules that define which 






Figure 1. The Denning Model for Intrusion Detection. 
Alerts 
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This basic model exists in nearly all intrusion detection systems and provides a neat 
reference point for comparing and contrasting how different intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) function. 
Activity profiles are particularly important'in Denning's model. A profile 
consists a metric (e.g. number of logins, length of TCP connections) and some type of 
statistical model of that metric. Denning describes three general metrics: Event Counter, 
Interval Timer, and Resource Measure. The event counter is simply a count of a 
particular data element such as the number of network packets received during a time 
interval. The interval timer is a measure of the time between particular events, such as 
user login and logout events. Denning describes the resource measure as an element that 
resides "at a level below the audit records". An example of a resource measure might be 
that a probability that a particular user logs in on a computer from midnight to 6 AM. 
This suggests that most resource measures but must be derived from data in the audit 
logs. Extracting resource measures from the available data is a form of data reduction 
since resource measures typically summarize other audit events. 
Another important component of Denning's model is the statistical models used 
to construct the activity profiles. Denning identifies several types of statistical models: 
• Operation Model - A fixed limit is used as the threshold for determining what 
abnormal means. 
• Mean and Standard Deviation Model - Input metrics are treated as random 
variables that have statistical mean and standard deviation. The mean and 
standard deviation are computed from input data over time using the equations: 
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• Multivariate Model - Similar to the Mean and Standard Deviation Model, except 
that it is based on correlations of two or more metrics. This method is particularly 
useful if better discriminating power can be obtained from combinations of 
related measures. 
• Markov Process Model - Regards the input events as state variables and 
sequences of events as state transition processes. This technique is useful for 
identifying intrusions characterized by a particular chain of events. An intrusion 
would be detected when the probability of a certain event occurring in the 
sequence was below a predefined threshold. 
• Time series models - Considers the events in the context of when the event 
occurred. A new observation is considered to be abnormal if the likelihood of it 
occurring at a particular time is low. 
While other statistical models can be used, they will generally be derived from the 
above models. A survey of intrusion detection systems indicates that while there are 
many different ways to implement a detection system, a large majority of the systems 
share one or more aspects of the Denning model for intrusion detection and vary 
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predominantly only in the techniques used. The Denning model is a surprisingly accurate 
description of almost all anomaly-based ID systems. 
Other Models 
There are models other than the Denning Model that have been used to describe 
frameworks for intrusion detection. One of these models is the computer immunology 
approach presented by Forrest, et al. [Forrest, 1997]. Their concept draws a strong 
analogy between the task of detecting hostile intrusions in a computer system and how a 
complex organism detects and isolates antigens in the bloodstream. After an initial 
training period, the system determines which system inputs/outputs constitute an image 
of "self' in the organism/computer system. System inputs that fail to match this concept 
of self are designated as intrusions. Kim and Bentley extend this research by 
investigating negative selection and pattern niching to reduce the amount of training 
necessary to evolve the system [Kim, 1998]. The computer immunology approach is 
interesting because it implies a built-in response to the intrusion. Though this approach 
has yet to be implemented in the real world, it presents an intriguing vision for intrusion 
detection in the future. 
Another approach that has attracted interest is the application of genetic 
algorithms to intrusion detection. Crosbie and Spafford describe an intrusion detection 
system that uses simple agents that focus on a particular aspect of the system [Crosbie 
and Spafford, 1995]. The agents learn patterns that indicate an intrusion and adapt their 
rules to new intrusions over time. Like the computer immunology approach, they can be 
directed to attack the intruder by shutting it down or limiting its access to system 
9 
resources. As we shall see, the use of autonomous agents as a fundamental data 
collection and processing component of an IDS is a popular idea. 
IDS Architectures 
It is important to note that Denning's model does not define an architecture for 
how the working components of the model must be implemented. However, Amoroso 
suggests that all intrusion detection systems are composed of several key elements as 
shown in Figure 2 [Amoroso, 1999]. Amoroso also defines several terms that are useful 
in describing the typical IDS system: 
• Target System - The system being monitored. This could be a network, a 
computer, or a service. 
• Feed - The source of the data (network, system logs, etc.) 
• Processing - The execution of algorithms designed to detect malicious activity. 
• Knowledge Base - A store of information about attack signatures or usage 
profiles that are used to identify malicious activity. 
• Storage - The IDS must store short term or long term information in order to 
identify attacks. 
• Alarms/Directives - Responses sent by the IDS to interested parties or another 
processing component when a security event occurs. Ex: Email, beepers, "raise 
the drawbridge" messages. 
• GUI/Operator Interface - An easy-to-use way for the security administrator to 
interact with the IDS. 
10 
• Communications Infrastructure - A consistent framework for how distributed 
parts of the IDS communicate. 
• Multiple intrusion detection systems - A site may use more than one IDS. 
Interoperability of the tools may be a consideration. 
• Network Management - Some larger networks use network management software 
for monitoring, reporting, and administration. This can be used in conjunction 
with the IDS. 
Several researchers have designed ID systems as a collection of agents that work 















Figure 2. All intrusion detection systems contain these key elements. From [Amoroso, 
1999]. 
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the EMERALD system developed at SRI [Porras and Neumann 1997]. EMERALD is a 
complex misuse and anomaly detection system that uses specialized agents to detect 
specific intrusions. The system is essentially hierarchical so that lower level monitoring 
agents can share their results with a management layer that coordinates the actions of the 
entire system The agents use a combination of statistical methods and experience 
databases to identify malicious activity. Also, the agents can monitor network-based and 
host-based data feeds. The management layer shares the results from the various agents 
with other agents while simultaneously constructing an overall view of the system state. 
The Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection (AAFID) system is also built 
from specialized agents that perform intrusion detection while sharing the results with 
other coordination elements in a hierarchical arrangement [Zamboni, 1998]. The AAFID 
architecture is designed to be fault tolerant in the presence of failures and to be 
lightweight. That is, AAFID uses readily available tools for network and host monitoring 
that can be run concurrently on the existing computer systems with minimal impact. 
In the aftermath of the Internet Worm unleashed in 1988 by Robert Morris, Jr. 
interest in intrusion detection as a practical science has increased. Kumar and Spafford 
explored using system call trace analysis to reveal pattern signatures [Kumar and 
Spafford, 1994]. They showed that by examining Unix system calls during execution of 
the sendmail program one could identify suspicious activity. Kumar used execution 
graphs to represent the path of system call execution and portray typical execution paths 
in the program Lane and Bradley expanded this research to explore the use of audit trail 
analysis as a means to identify typical system behavior [Lane and Bradley, 1999]. Their 
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research showed that typical profiles could be established for a variety of system usages 
and that anomalies to these profiles could reveal intrusion activity. 
Another valuable intrusion detection system is the Graph-based Intrusion 
Detection System (GrIDS) developed at UC Davis [Bishop et al., 1997]. GrIDS models a 
network as an activity graph where machines represent the nodes in the graph and 
connections between systems are represented as edges. Benign activity on a network 
over time forms an activity graph for the network. Current activity is compared against 
known signatures for hostile activity to produce security warnings. 
Data Reduction 
Data reduction is important to anomaly detection for two reasons. First, data 
reduction can reduce amount of storage required to represent the information in a typical 
data stream. Second, data reduction can be used to represent the data in a form that is 
more amenable to performing intrusion detection analysis. Several researchers have 
noted the importance of data reduction in the anomaly detection process. Lane and 
Bradley showed that by filtering out key data elements that a profile data set could be 
greatly reduced while yielding improved anomaly-detection performance. Denning also 
discusses the necessity for data reduction in [Denning, 1987]. 
Data Aggregation 
Data aggregation is the technique of combining data fields together to form new 
data objects. Frequently, it is used to group dependent data objects. Denning argues that 
data aggregation is an effective technique for representing the dependence of two or more 
data elements. 
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Data Source Selection 
Several researchers have discussed which data elements should be selected when 
developing anomaly detection schemes. Lee and Wenke discuss how classifiers can be 
induced from tcpdump data to distinguish network attacks from normal traffic [Lee and 
Wenke, 1997]. Their approach used a tcpdump trace as a training input to a data classifier 
algorithm They concluded that adding temporal-statistical features to the data can 
greatly improve the performance of the classifier engine. They acknowledge that 
choosing the right features to analyze in the input data takes considerable time and a deep 
understanding of the input domain. They also acknowledge that there is need for tools 
that can provide insight into the patterns that might be exhibited in the data and for tools 
that can help the security analyst understand the nature of the observed anomalies. 
Network Data Reduction 
A number of researchers have explored the problem of reducing data to a form 
that can be analyzed efficiently. Zhang and Paxson have applied packet signature 
analysis to network traces to reveal patterns associated with intruder backdoors and the 
use of stepping stone machines to hide the origination point [Zhang and Paxson, 2000]. 
Their research showed that packet header data was sufficient to identify potentially 
malicious activity. They also showed that one could eliminate a large amount of network 
data, such as outgoing web traffic, with no loss of detection accuracy. 
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Fuzzy Systems 
A fuzzy system is an expert system that uses a collection of fuzzy membership 
functions and rules, instead of Boolean logic, to reason aoout data The rules in a fuzzy 
system are usually of a form similar to the following: 
if A is LOW and B is HIGH then C = MEDIUM 
where A and B are input variables, C is an output variable, LOW is a fuzzy 
membership function defined on A, HIGH is a membership function defined on B, and 
MEDIUM is a membership function defined on C. The "if' part of the rule describes to 
what degree the rule applies, while the "then" of the rule assigns a membership function 
to each of one or more output variables. In fuzzy systems the rules may overlap. When 
this happens, the outcomes are evaluated together and an approximation of the overall 
response is determined. The set of rules in a fuzzy expert system is known as the rule 
base or knowledge base. The general inference process in a fuzzy system occurs in four 
steps: 
1. Fuzzification. The membership functions defined on the input variables are 
applied to their actual values, to determine the degree of truth for each rule 
premise. 
2. Inference. The truth-value for the premise of each rule is computed, and applied 
to the conclusion part of each rule. This results in one fuzzy subset to be assigned 
to each output variable for each rule. Usually only MIN or PRODUCT are used 
as inference rules. In MIN inferencing, the output membership function is clipped 
off at a height corresponding to the rule premise's computed degree of truth (fuzzy 
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logic AND). In PRODUCT inferencing, the output membership function is scaled 
by the rule premise's computed degree of truth. 
3. Composition. All of the fuzzy subsets assigned to each output variable are 
combined together to form a single fuzzy subset for each output variable. This 
can be done a variety of ways. The two most common methods are MAX and 
SUM composition. In MAX composition, the combined output fuzzy subset is 
constructed by taking the point wise maximum over all of the fuzzy subsets 
assigned to a variable by the inference rule (fuzzy logic OR). In SUM 
composition, the combined output fuzzy subset is constructed by taking the point 
wise sum over all of the fuzzy subsets assigned to the output variable by the 
inference rule. 
4. Defuzzification. This is used when it is useful to convert the fuzzy output set to a 
crisp number. Quite a few defuzzification algorithms are known. Two of the 
more common techniques are the CENTROID and MAXIMUM methods. In the 
CENTROID method, the crisp value of the output variable is computed by finding 
the variable value of the center of gravity of the membership function for the 
fuzzy value. In the MAXIMUM method, one of the variable values at which the 
fuzzy subset has its maximum truth-value is chosen as the crisp value for the 
output variable. 
Clustering Techniques for Identifying Rules 
While it is possible to create the fuzzy rule base analytically without relying on 
input or training data, a more common approach is to use real-world data to help define 
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the fuzzy membership functions. This process of deriving fuzzy rule sets from data 
usually involves analyzing the input and output spaces to find the natural clusters that 
relate an input domain to an output response. The clusters define the centroids and 
ranges of the fuzzy rules. For this research, we use the Fuzzy C-means clustering 
technique. 
Fuzzy C-Means Clustering 
The fuzzy c-means (FCM) algorithm minimizes the objective function [Bezdek, 
1981]. 
C 
subject to u;i e [0,1] and L"ik = 1 't/ k (2) 
i=l 
U is the partition matrix that shows to what degree the k-th data point Xk belongs 
to each cluster as measured by its distance from the prototype of the i-th cluster, Vj. m is 
a weighting exponent. c is the number of clusters and n is the number of data points. 
This well-known algorithm has the steps listed below [Bezdek, 1981]: 
1) Fix the number of clusters c, 2 ~ c < n ; choose an inner product metric, such 
as the Euclidean norm and the weighting exponent m, 1 ~ m < oq Initialize the partition 
U(O). 
2) Calculate the c fuzzy cluster centers {v/lJ}using 
n 
I(u;krxk 
V . = ~k=~l~--
1 n (3) 
l(u;k'f' 
k=l 




;k - ±( llxk - v J 12/(m-1) 
j=l llxk -v it 
(4) 
4) If llu(l+l) _ u(l)I s £ then stop, otherwise repeat steps 2 through 4. 
Visual Data Mining 
Data mining is the process of finding hidden features and relationships in data 
[Shearing, 1997]. Visual data mining presents data visually in order to help the data 
analyst see features that would be hard to describe verbally or understand with numerical 
statistics alone [Buja and Cook, 1996]. Visual data mining is most useful when 
characteristics in the data are not obvious until the data are viewed graphically. There are 
quite a few methods for viewing data visually. Some of the more common methods are: 
Scatter plots - Multi-column data records are plotted in 2-D or 3-D. Scatter 
plots are especially useful for plotting data elements in which 
one or more of the axes are not numerical quantities (e.g. words 
or strings). Scatter plot viewers will attempt to display points 
with similar features together. 
Splat visualizers- Splat visualizers attempt to create clusters from the input data 
elements to help visualize general structures in the data. 
Data classification - Data classification performs regression analysis on the data 
to identify which data elements are the most significant to a 




There are a number of design criteria that one must be aware of when 
implementing an intrusion detection system. Since some of the criteria conflict, it is up 
to the designer to identify those criteria that are most crucial to the goals of the IDS. We 
can summarize some of the most desirable design goals as follows: 
• Timeliness - The reporting of intrusion events to the security administrator should 
occur within a short time period of time after their onset. The ideal system should 
be able to report suspicious activity in real-time. 
• Reliability- The IDS should be able to identify all intrusion activity. The system 
should have a low false negative rate [Amoroso, 1999]. 
• Accuracy - Ideally, an IDS will generate a low number of false positive 
detections. If the number of false positives is large, the security administrator 
may learn to ignore the results of the IDS [Amoroso, 1999]. 
• Flexibility - The security administrator should be able to adapt the IDS to new 
types of attacks with a minjmal of reconfiguration or training of the system. 
Similarly, one should be able to turn off detection features when they are no 
longer needed. 
• Adaptability - The IDS should be able to adapt to changes in the system being 
monitored over time. The system should be able to adjust to new meanings of 
"normal" or "abnormal". 
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• Appropriateness - One should be able to configure the IDS in consistence with 
the security policy in effect [Zamboni, 1998]. 
• Unobtrusiveness - The IDS should have a minimal impact on system resources. 
The configuration of the system should not interfere with the normal operation of 
the systems or networks that it monitors. 
• Fault Tolerance - The IDS should be able to function in the presence of IDS 
component faults. The system should be able to produce valid responses with a 
degraded number of inputs, though perhaps with a lower confidence in the result. 
• Resistance to Subversion - The IDS itself must be resistant to attacks. An 
attacker should not be able to disable the IDS nor insert false or misleading 
information to the IDS. 
It should be apparent that meeting all of these goals optimally would be difficult. 
The IDS designer then must identify the most important characteristics for their 
application and accept the appropriate trade-offs in design criteria. Some of these trade-
offs are being driven by changes in the computer security "landscape" 
Changes in the Computer Security Landscape 
The computer world has been undergoing a startling amount of change in recent 
years. These changes are forcing security administrators to modify how they do their 
jobs. This trend is quite apparent in intrusion detection. The increase in switched 
networks has made it more difficult for network monitoring tools to observe all traffic on 
a LAN. Increasingly, a computer running in a promiscuous network-sniffing mode will 
only be able to see the network packets sent from or to it. Network intrusion detection 
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systems will tend to distribute the role of network data gathering to a number of IDS 
devices and cooperate on the task of data correlation. Another trend that will affect 
future IDS designs is that network speeds are in~reasing faster than the ability of 
individual computers to analyze the potential network traffic. Today it is nearly 
impossible for dedicated IDS systems to keep pace with the amount of network data that 
passes through a typical network router [Ranum, 1999]. This i1, forcing network IDS 
systems to become more distributed and detection components to be more specific. Also, 
more and more traffic is encrypted. Web traffic, virtual private network (VPN) 
connections, and even backdoor channels set up by intruders are some examples of 
encrypted data that travel over our computer networks. This is making it very difficult 
for misuse detection systems that rely on the ability to scan for a particular pattern in the 
network stream. Instead, monitoring of host-based logs and system activity will play an 
increasing role in intrusion detection. Finally, there has been a steady increase in mobile 
computing in recent years leading to huge increase in the number of legitimate users 
connecting from remote locations or relying on dynamic host address allocation. 
Network patterns of usage are likely to become more varied, causing network data to 
become less effective as intrusion detection data source. 
We can conclude from these trends that the ID systems of the future will have 
these characteristics: 
• They will consist of multiple monitoring agents that cooperate and share 
information about the states of the network and computer systems. 
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• Intrusion detection assessment will increasingly rely on the ability to combine 
results from network and host-based monitoring processes. 




Many of the implementation decisions during this proof-of-concept are influenced 
by the design of FIRE system. FIRE is designed to be a practical tool used by security 
administrators for monitoring the security of their networks. The FIRE goals are: 
• To demonstrate how fuzzy systems can be used in intrusion detection. 
• To identify which data sources provide the best inputs to the fuzzy intrusion 
detection system. 
• To determine the best methods for representing network input data. 
• To show how the system can be scaled to distributed intrusion detection involving 
multiple hosts and/or networks. 
Additionally, the system has been designed with two additional goals: to use 
readily available software and hardware as much as possible, and to be a tool accessible 
to the system/security administrator. 
System Architecture 
FIRE is expected to consist of the four types of components shown in Figure 4. 
There are two types of data collector components, the network data collector (NDC) and 
the log data collector (LDC). There are two types of data analysis tools: the network 
data analyzer (NDA), which process network data, and the log data analyzer (LDA), 
which processes system logs. However, for this proof-of-concept, only the network data 



































Figure 4. The FIRE architecture. Data is collected from network streams and system logs. 
Historical data is analyzed against current metrics. Fuzzy metrics are collected from the 
data analyzers by the fuzzy threat analyzer and used to produce alerts. 
produce input values that are read by the fuzzy threat analyzer (FT A). The outputs of the 
fuzzy threat analyzer are made available to a restricted web server and posted on a web 
page. 
The Network Data Collector 
For this proof-of-concept, a Network Data Collector program was developed 
called ndump. This program is run at periodic intervals using the cron facility under 
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Unix. The length of data collection interval is important as it represents the maximum 
response time between when an attack is started and when the information is reported to 
the security administrator. Too long a response time may allow too long a period to go 
by before the administrator is made aware of a serious attack, and too short a time may 
not allow enough data to be collected for meaningful statistics. Normally, a data 
collection interval of ten minutes provides a reasonably good trade-off between system 
response and completeness of data collection. Ndump uses the tcpdump utility developed 
at Lawrence Livermore Labs for all raw network data collection. This is similar to the 
network data collection method used by the Shadow network-monitoring tool [CIDER, 
1999]. Since tcpdump is only available for variants of the Unix operating system, 
network data collection units must be Unix-based computers. 
Ndump executes in two phases. First, it checks to see if there is a previous 
tcpdump process already running on the computer. If there is, it is stopped and the raw 
tcpdump log file that process was writing is copied to a temporary location on the hard 
drive. Ndump then forks another tcpdump process to begin collecting packets to a new 
tcpdump log. During the second phase, ndump extracts the data from the tcpdump log 
copied to the temporary location. Ndump makes one pass through the log file, sorting 
information according to TCP, UDP, and ICMP packet types. 
As it sorts the tcpdump log file, ndump performs important filtering, data 
aggregation, and reformatting of the data to creates a very compact summary of the 
network data seen during the data collection interval. Outgoing web traffic (i.e. packets 
with a local source address equal to the local domain and with a destination port of 80) is 
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discarded since there is simply too much data of this type and it is generally uninteresting 
from an intrusion detection perspective. The data is reformatted and appended to an 
hi5torical log of packet data. Each packet type (i.e. TCP, UDP, and ICMP) has its own 
historical log. We will expand on the content of the historical logs when we discuss the 
data reduction process performed by the network data analyzer program. 
It is important to note that ndump processes the network data collection in two 
phases in order to minimize packet loss. While developing ndump, it was discovered that 
attempting to sort or reformat each packet as it was read by tcpdump caused an 1/0 
bottleneck leading to dropped or lost packets. This is caused when network packets 
arrive at the input queue of the network interface card too frequently to allow the packet 
processing routines to sort, format and log all packets waiting in the read buffer on the 
interface card. The interface card simply drops the oldest packets in the input queue to 
make room for newly arriving packets. To prevent this, ndump processes the network 
data in two parallel phases. The raw tcpdump data collected for the previous collection 
interval is processed while the current collection interval is saving data to a new tcpdump 
log. In our tests, we could avoid packet loss altogether on a moderately busy, 
unswitched, lOMb/s Ethernet interface by writing the tcpdump output directly to disk and 
processing it afterwards. 
The Network Data Analyzer 
The goal of the network data analyzer (NDA) is to derive network metrics from 
the historical logs and to update the fuzzy rule constraints immediately afterwards. For 
this proof-of-concept implementation, the data reduction function and fuzzy rule updates 
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are performed separately. The fuzzy rule constraint updates are performed by hand using 
Matlab. It is expected that in the FIRE system, these two functions will be incorporated 
into the data processing performed by the ndump program. The current network data 
reduction program, called plotter, is written in Perl. The plotter program runs on the 
same computer where ndump is run to avoid adding extra network traffic to the data 
stream. 
Plotter reads the historical network logs of network data and creates numerous 
derived elements. The kinds of metrics produced by the plotter program is crucial to 
determining what types of intrusions can be detected. 
Data Description 
Network Data Reduction 
Because we must create statistics of the network traffic over time, it is important 
to save network data for periods of a week or more. Saving a month's worth of data from 
a typical network would pose a considerable storage problem. We have found that using 
data aggregation enables us to create relatively compact logs without significant loss of 
network information. Our basic approach is to store network data under an aggregate data 
key that represents a network connection or service points. There are three types of 
aggregate keys: the sdp, the sdt, the servid. The sdp is formed by concatenating the 
source IP address, destination IP address, and destination port into a single key. The sdt 
performs the same function as the sdp, however it applies only to ICMP connections. It 
is composed of the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the ICMP type. The 
servid is an aggregate key composed of the destination IP address and the destination 
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port. In each case, the aggregate key becomes an efficient way to represent the type of 
service connection between hosts on the network. 
TCP State Monitoring 
UDP and ICMP data are relatively easy to monitor because they are connection-
less. Though we treat each UDP or ICMP packet as a unique connection in this analysis, 
this is a simplification, since some ICMP and UDP dialogs depend upon primitive state 
information. For TCP data, however, it is very important to be able to monitor the state 
of the connection. To do this, we must observe the TCP flags sent between two hosts and 
record the state using a state machine. For this research, the network data collection 
program tracks the TCP state information. The TCP state machine works as follows: 
1. For each packet observed, a connection ID is constructed that consists of the 
source IP + source port + destination IP + destination port. If the connection 
id has not been observed before, then we flip the ID around to see if the id has 
been observed by the designation destination IP+ destination port+ source IP 
+ source port. A new connection ID is added to the list of connection IDs. 
Initially, the connection is given a TCP state of 0. 
2. The TCP flags are extracted from each TCP packet used to update the state of 
that TCP connection. 
3. If the TCP flags are consistent with the expected state of the connection, the 
connection state is updated as necessary. In order to assess the state, it is 
necessary to record the TCP sequence number and offset, and to calculate the 
expected sequence number for a future packet. 
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4. The normal progression of TCP states is from SYN -- SYN-ACK- ACK -
FIN.- FIN-ACK----+ FIN-ACK. Alternatively, the FIN shutdown sequence 
can be skipped when one end of the connection issues a RESET, in which 
case an acknowledgement is not required. 
5. There are two common situations that occur when a connection is not 
successful. A connection attempt to a closed port would see a dialog of SYN 
-- RESET. A prematurely closed connection would see a sequence of 
SYN.- SYN-ACK-RESET. 
While the behavior described above is certainly not an exhaustive treatment of all 
TCP states possible or even those commonly observed, it forms the vast majority of all 
TCP traffic on a network. 
Exceptions to TCP State Processing 
Intruders frequently make use of undefined behavior in the TCP specification to 
gather information about open service ports on a host. For this reason, it is not sufficient 
to monitor only those connections that obey the normal TCP startup and shutdown 
sequences. For example, if a server host receives a FIN connection on an open port from 
a client before a SYN->SYN-ACK startup sequence has been properly initiated, the host 
will normally issue a TCP RESET packet in response. An intruder can use this behavior 
to help expose those ports that are in use on a system without ever starting a proper 
connection. This type of port scanning is sometimes called "stealthy'' port scanning since 
these exceptions are dealt with by the operating system kernel and not forwarded to 
higher level access control tools such as TCP dump. Since some of the more interesting 
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network traffic from an intrusion detection point of view lies in these failed connections, 
the TCP status of every TCP connection is recorded by ndump, regardless of its outcome. 
Another difficult issue to contend with in TCP data is the problem of long-lived 
connections. Many types of client/server applications start connections and keep them 
open for weeks or even months at a time. This makes is very difficult to establish which 
end of the connection is the server, and which end is the client. Though one might 
assume that a host receiving connections on a so-called well-known port must be the 
server, this would cause one to miss a great deal of scanning or backdoor type 
connections. 
Data Selection 
The sdp is a key composed of the source IP address, destination IP address, and 
destination port number of a network connection. The sdp can used to reference both 
TCP and UDP connections. The sdt is composed from source IP address, destination IP 
address, and ICMP type of an ICMP connection. As this suggests, the sdt is used to 
represent ICMP data. The served is composed of the destination IP address and 
destination port of hosts that are providing a service on a port. The servid is only 
applicable to machines that are observed providing a TCP service. The reason for this is 
to help detect connections to unusual ports such as one would see in a Trojan horse or 
backdoor intrusion [Ruiu, 1999] 
Data reduction extracts essential information from the raw data and stores it in a 
form that allows for fast recalculation of statistics. We have found that by pre-processing 
the network data to extract particular measures, we can greatly reduce the amount of 
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historical data we need to save while simultaneously retaining only the data that enhances 
our ability to detect anomalies. 
The scheme for reducing network data is as follows: 
1. For TCP data, ignore outgoing web traffic. This is a reasonably safe assumption 
since web surfing produces extremely random connection patterns and is 
generally uninteresting security-wise. However, we do maintain a list of internal 
web servers. Incoming web traffic destined for hosts not on our list of internal 
web servers is tracked. 
2. Other than above, track all TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic. 
3. Discard all other packets. 
4. Monitor the state of TCP connections. Successful connections that followed the 
normal TCP 3-way handshake to start up, and which followed the normal 
shutdown sequence are recorded with a state of 6. Successful connections that are 
reset are given a state of 7. Failed connections are assigned the state of 10. Half-
open connections are assigned a state of 9. All of these states are recorded in a 
log according to according to sdp. This allows many connections to be 
represented with a single log entry. 
Even by taking these steps, there are still too many packets to store for historical 
purposes. We can further reduce the amount of information we need to store by 
considering the importance of data to the detection of anomalies. For this analysis, we 
ignore packet payload data. Each a summary representing the outcome of a connection is 
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saved. Assuming that ''friendly" machines frequently make the same network 
connections to the same types of network services (FTP, telnet, etc.), we are generally 
only interested in identifying unusual host/service combinations. 
We apply a novel method to represent a host/service combination. If we form an 
aggregate field by concatenating the source IP address, destination IP address, and 
destination IP port of TCP headers together, we create a new field we refer to as the sdp. 
The sdp represents a particular service connection between two hosts. We can then use 
the sdp as the basis for our statistical analysis of the network data. The TCP log data can 
be reduced to a summary of sdp observations. In fact, the TCP historical log created by 
the NDC is simply a list of the number of packets seen for each sdp during a collection 
interval. By pre-processing the network data in this fashion, we can reduce the amount of 
storage required to less than 1 % of that required to store the raw input data. 
Network Metrics 
There are several groups of metrics gathered for the network data. There are 
general metrics which summarize TCP, UDP, and ICMP connections for a time interval. 
For UDP and TCP, detailed metrics are also gathered for each observed service port in 
the time interval. Additional metrics are gathered for TCP servers. The general metrics 
gathered for TCP connections are shown in Table 1. The values collected for TCP port 
statistics are shown in Table 2. Table 3 lists the values that are extracted for each 
observed TCP server observed. General metrics gathered for UDP connections is shown 
in Table 2. General metrics for ICMP traffic is shown in Table 3. 
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Table 1. General TCP Metrics. 
Name of Metric Description 
NumConnections Number of connections seen in a time interval. 
NumAttempts Number of connections attempted (SYN observed). 
NumFailed Number of connections failed (RESET in response 
to SYN). 
NumOpened Number of connections that were successfully 
opened. 
NumCompleted Number of connections that were properly 
completed (normal shutdown sequence). 
NumReset Number of proper connections that were ended 
with a RESET. 
NumSDPs Number of SDPs observed. 
NumSrcs Number of source IP addresses observed. 
NumDests Number of destination IP addresses observed. 
NumForeign Number of Foreign IP addresses observed. 
Num Services Number of service ports observed in use 
(successful connections only). 
NumServers Number of hosts that accepted a connection on a 
service port. 
NumUniqSDPs Number of unique SDPs observed during the 
interval. 
NumUniqSrcs Number of unique source IP addresses observed 
during the interval. 
NumUniqDests Number of unique destination IP address observed 
during the interval. 
NumUniqForeign Number of unique foreign SDPs (source IP ·address 
from outside the sub network). 
NumU niq Services Number of unique services observed. 
NumUniqServers Number of unique servers observed. 
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Table 2. TCP service port metrics. These metrics are gathered for each service port 
b dd . h. . al o serve unng eac tune mterv . 
Name of Metric Description 
NumSrcs Number of source IP addresses that connected to this 
port. 
NumUniqSrcs Number of unique source IP addresses that connected 
to this port. (successful or not) 
NumDests Number of destination IP addresses for this port 
(successful or not). 
NumNewDests Number of unique destination IP addresses (servers) 
for this port. 
NumSDPs Number of SDPs observed connecting to this port 
(successful or not). 
NumUniqueSDPs Number of unique SDPs observed connecting to this 
port (successful or not). 
ForeignSDPs Number of foreign SDPs observed connecting to this 
port (successful or not). 
UniqForeignSDPs Number of unique foreign SDPs observed connecting 
to this port (successful or not). 
NumServers Number of hosts observed accepting connecting 
connections on this port. 
NumU niqServers Number of unique hosts observed accepting 
connections on this port. 
Connections Number of connections observed on this port 
(successful or not). 
Attempts Number of attempted connections on this port (SYN 
sent). 
Successes Number of successful connections on this port. 
Failed Number of failed connections on this port. 
Unclaimed Number of unclaimed connections on this port. 
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Table 3. TCP server metrics. These metrics are gathered for each observed server at 
each time interval. A server is identified as any host that receives a properly initiated 
TCP connection from another host. 
Name of Metric Description 
NumClients Number of clients that successfully connected to this 
server. 
NumUniqClients Number of unique clients that successfully connected 
to this server. 
ForeignClients Number of foreign clients that connected to this server. 
U niqForeignClients Number of unique foreign clients that connected to this 
server. 
Connections Number of successful connections to this server. 
Table 4. General UDP Metrics. These metrics are gathered for each collection interval. 
Name of Metric Description 
NumConnections Number of connections seen in a time interval. 
NumFailed Number of connections failed (An ICMP port 
unreachable error was recorded). 
NumSDPs Number of SDPs observed. 
NumSrcs Number of source IP addresses observed. 
NumDests Number of destination IP addresses observed. 
NumForeign Number of Foreign IP addresses observed. 
Num Services Numt;,er of service ports observed in use (successful 
connections only). 
NumServers Number of hosts that accepted a connection on a 
service port. 
NumUniqSDPs Number of unique SDPs observed during the interval. 
NumUniqSrcs Number of unique source IP addresses observed during 
the interval. 
NumUniqDests Number of unique destination IP address observed 
during the interval. 
NumUniqForeign Number of unique foreign SDPs (source IP address 
from outside the sub network). 
NumUniq Services Number of unique services observed. 
NumU niqServers Number of unique servers observed. 
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Table 5. General ICMP Metrics. These metrics are gathered for each collection interval. 
Name of Metric Description 
NumConnections Number of connections seen in a time interval 
NumFailed Number of connections failed (An ICMP port 
unreachable error was recorded) 
NumSDTs Number of SDTs observed 
NumSrcs Number of source IP addresses observed 
NumDests Number of destination IP addresses observed 
NumForeign Number of Foreign IP addresses observed 
Num Types Number ofICMP types observed in use 
NumUniqSDTs Number of unique SDPs observed during the interval. 
NumUniqSrcs Number of unique source IP addresses observed during 
the interval 
NumUniqDests Number of unique destination IP address observed 
during the interval 
NumUniqForeign Number of unique foreign SDPs (source IP address from 
outside the sub network) 
NumUniq Types Number of unique ICMP types observed. 
Fuzzy Systems Development 
Fuzzy Input Value Generation 
The system uses two techniques to create fuzzy sets: Fuzzy C-means clustering, 
and statistical distributions. The choice of which fuzzy set generation technique to use is 
determined solely by the expected profile of the observed data. Data that reveals a good 
distribution of values over time appears to provide the best results when Fuzzy C-means 
clustering is utilized. Statistical methods appear to be best when applied to data that has 
a sparse distribution in observed values. 
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To understand how different input data can have such vastly different input sets, it 
is helpful to look at a couple of examples. One of the values that the system measures is 
the number of new servers observed on the network. We would expect that in a stable 
network, weeks might transpire before a new legitimate server is added to the network. 
This means that most of the time the number of new servers observed will be zero. 
There would be no discernible clusters from which to construct fuzzy rules. In this case, 
we simply revert to a conventional statistical model where the fuzzy term MEDIUM 
indicates those values that lay within one standard deviation of the mean, MEDIUM-
HIGH represents values between 1 and 2 standard deviations above the mean, and HIGH 
is applied to values greater than two standard deviations above the mean. 
Fuzzy Output Values 
The output of the fuzzy system corresponds to the degree to which the fuzzy 
system detects the intrusion condition it is designed to detect. For consistency, the same 
output membership function is used for all of the fuzzy systems. There are five 
membership functions in each output set: LOW, MED-LOW, MEDIUM, MED-HIGH, 
and HIGH. The membership functions are uniformly distributed in the range from 0.0 to 
1.0. Figure 5 shows a typical set of output membership functions for an alert. 
Creating Fuzzy Rules for Intrusion Detection 
With the fuzzy input sets defined, the next step is to write the rules for detecting 
each type of attack. A collection of fuzzy rules with the same input and output variables 
is called a fuzzy system. We assume that the security administrator can use their expert 
knowledge to help create a set of rules for each attack. The rules are created using the 
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fuzzy system editor contained in the Matlab Fuzzy Toolbox. This tool contains a 
graphical user interface that allows the rule designer to create the member functions for 
each input or output variable, create the inference relationships between the various 
member functions, and to examine the control surface for the resulting fuzzy system. But 
it is not expected that the rule designer will rely solely on intuition to create the rules. 
We feel that visual data mining can help the rule designer understand data features are 
most relevant to detecting different kinds of attacks. 
Figure 5. Typical fuzzy output membership function used by each detection fuzzy 
system. The membership functions correspond to the degree in which an alert condition 
is true. 
Data Mining Tools 
Visual data mining plays an important role in this analysis. A good data mining 
tool must provide several key capabilities: 
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Ad Hoc Queries The analyst should be able to pose "what if' kinds of questions 
against the data. 
Filtering The tool should be able to select data based upon certain 
filtering criteria. 
Data aggregation One should have the ability to join fields together and perform 
queries, etc. against the aggregated data. 
Binning 
Clustering 
The system should be able to create histograms for so-called 
"parameter-less" data such as strings and other non-numeric 
data. 
Ideally, the system should be able to recognize similar data 
records and group them. 
The Mineset program from Silicon Graphics Incorporated is used for all data 
mining analysis. This tool provides all the features listed above. However, one of 
Mineset's strengths is in the 3-D visualization of data. The data-mining analyst is 
expected to use it interactively at a graphics monitor. As a result, its printed output is not 




The following approach was used to test the fuzzy intrusion detection system. 
The ndump program was installed on a machine in the Information Systems Security 
Laboratory that could "see" other traffic on the network. The system gathered data for an 
extended period of time (usually 7 to 14 days) to develop "normal" network profiles. 
After this period, attacks were launched against systems on the ISSL network to simulate 
intruder behavior. The normal and attack network data were processed by the fire 
program to derive the set of metrics. Visual data mining software was used to plot 
various combinations of metrics to see what features were useful for observing the 
attacks. Next, fuzzy rules were written that used the metrics that seemed most useful for 
visualizing the attacks. 
The normal profile data was used to create the values for the fuzzy member 
functions of fuzzy rules. Fuzzy c-means and conventional statistical means were used to 
create the centers and limits for the fuzzy sets. We then ran the attack data against the 
fuzzy systems created from the normal profiles to see if the fuzzy system for each kind of 
attack would produce the desired alert values .. 
The Test Environment 
For the test environment, we used computers and networks available to us in the 
Informations Systems Security Laboratory (!SSL) at Iowa State University. The lab 
consists of approximately thirty computers of various operating systems and hardware 
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configurations. In general, all systems are directly connected to the Internet. Since the 
machines were directly connected to the Internet, we frequently observed suspicious 
activity occurring "in the wild". When unusual data was observed, it was often 
necessary to analyze the source of the suspicious activity to confirm the nature of the 
traffic. Sometimes, this revealed rather surprising results. 
Attack Phases 
The technical approach was tested using different types of intrusion activity that 
reflected the typical phases an attacker would use against a target. A determined intruder 
will often follow four phases to gain access to a system [McClure, 1999]: 
1. Surveillance. The attacker seeks to learn what the target consists of with 
regards to hosts on a network, operating systems, and kinds of services 
available. 
2. Information Gathering: Attempting to identify host names, account names, 
or shared resources on a network. 
3. Penetration. In this phase, the attacker tries to gain access to a resource of the 
target. This could involve taking administrative or root privileges on the 
target, or installing a program that performs on behalf of the attacker. 
4. Exploitation. In this phase, the attacker uses a target resource in a way that 
violates the security policy of the target. This could mean extracting data, 
installing a backdoor, or even denying a service on the system. (Unauthorized 
Servers). 
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An intruder does not necessarily follow these phases in sequence. Some attacks 
may attempt the penetration and exploitation phases first and skip the surveillance and 
information gathering phases. 
Attack Scenarios 
A different attack was selected to represent each phase. The attack used and the 
phases they represent are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. The attacks used for each intrusion phase. 
Phase Attack 
Surveillanceffarget Acquisition Nmap scans 
Information gathering Portmapper probe 
Penetration BIND buffer overflow 
Exploitation Denial of Service (Pingflood) 
Exploitation Installation of unauthorized server. 
Scenario 1: Host or Port Scanning 
In a common intrusion scenario, an attacker conducts a remote scan of a network 
or hosts, trying to identify which hosts exist and which service ports are in use. 
Typically, this type of information gathering is performed as a precursor to a more 
specific attack. There are three general forms of scanning: network scans, service scans, 
and host scans. A network scan seeks to find which hosts on a network are up. A service 
scan is usually scans many machines to see if specific services are installed, such as Ff P 
or SMTP. A host scan targets a single machine to find out which TCP or UDP ports are 
in use, though a particularly aggressive attacker may launch a host scan against many 
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hosts. There are several reasons why an attacker may perform host or post scans on a 
network: 
, 1. The attacker may be simply trying to find out which hosts are up on a network 
or find out which machines are associated with a given domain. Machines 
within the same name service sub-domain (e.g . .iastate.edu) may be sharing 
resources or account information. This fact may be useful to the attacker. 
2. An attacker may be trying to find out if there are specific servers (e.g. FTP) in 
use on a network in order to exploit a known vulnerability in the server. 
3. The attacker may be trying to identify the operating system on the target 
machine using OS fingerprinting. Knowledge of the services running and the 
host operating system is extremely valuable to the attacker because it helps to 
narrow the types of vulnerabilities the attacker can exploit on the systems. 
To test this scenario, network and service scans were run on local subnets in the 
ISSL, and host scans against several test systems in the ISSL. All scans were performed 
using the nmap tool because it implements several types of scanning techniques and since 
it is probably the most common scanning tool used by attackers. The network scans were 
launched both from a machine on the ISSL local area network, and from a ''foreign" 
machine outside the ISSL LAN. The scans were run with at least 30 minutes between 
scans so that the plots wouldn't appear cluttered. Prior to running the attacks, data was 
collected by the system for approximately two weeks to produce a good sense of 
"normal" behavior. 
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After the attacks were completed, the plotter program was run to produce the set 
of metrics for each time ten minute time interval of the preceding fourteen days. The 
unreduced data for the network scan is shown in Figure 6. In this figure, time is shown 
along the right axis increasing toward the viewer, and individual SDPs are shown along 
the back axis. The number of packets sent for each SDP is shown in the vertical axis. 
From this plot, the port scan are easy to observe as horizontal structures along the base of 
the graph. This is to be expected since a port scan is likely to generate a large set of 
unique SDPs in a short amount of time. Also, a port scan frequently sends just one or 
two packets on each port, so we would expect the data points to lie along the base of the 
plot. These plots suggest that the number of unique SDPs in a period of time of time is 
strong indicator for a scan. To tell whether the scan is a network, service, or host scan, 
we will need to combine this with other metrics. 
With each type of scan, there are telltale signs that we can use when devising the 
detection rules. If the attackers use stealth TCP scanning techniques, we would expect to 
see a large number of unusual TCP SDPs, and a large number of TCP reset packets. 
However, if an attacker used a stealth TCP scan for a single service, he would be able to 
simultaneously perform a network scan and a service scan, so it would be extremely 
difficult to identify the intent of the scan. However, if more than one service port on a 
network received an unusual number of SDPs then we could conclude primarily that a 
service scan was taking place. Naturally, if a large number of service ports were 
observed in an interval and the number of destinations hosts was small, we could 
conclude that a host scan was taking place. 
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Figure 6. 3-D Plot of unreduced TCP data for a two-week period that shows patterns of 
TCP connections. Each point represents a potential connection between two hosts on 
specific service port. Three types of scans appear as short horizontal bands of points. 
Long vertical bands are regularly occurring connections. Time is shown on the right axis 
with most recent data nearest the viewer. The back axis is histogram of SDPs observed 
during the collection period. 
Figure 7 attempts to illustrate this argument. The figure shows a 3-D plot of three 
metrics gathered over the two-week data collection period both prior to the scans being 
run and including the scans. The plot shows the three metrics that we are interested in: 
number of unusual SDPs, number of destination hosts observed, and number of service 
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ports observed. The host scan stands out as a lone point at the upper right of the graph, 
the service scan as the point in the middle on the bottom of the graph, and the network 
scan as a point nearest the user. This graph serves to suggest that these three metrics 
alone may be sufficient indicators for identifying TCP scanning activity. 
Figure 7. A 3-D plot of the count of unique SDPs, destination hosts, and service ports for 
each data collection interval over a two-week period. The host scan appears as the lone 
point at the upper right, the service scan as the lone point out in the middle, and the 
network scan as the point nearest the viewer at the bottom. 
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Using these arguments as a basis, we can devise some fuzzy rules that would be 
most representative of a particular type of scan. The metrics used are the count of 
unusual SDPs, the count of destination hosts, and the count of observed service ports. 
A TCP Service Scan 
If the COUNT of UNUSUAL SDPs is HIGH 
And the COUNT of DESTINATION HOSTS is HIGH 
And the COUNT of SERVICE Ports observed is MEDIUM-LOW 
Then Service Scan of Port N is HIGH 
A TCP Network/Service Scan 
If the COUNT of UNUSUAL SDPs is HIGH 
And the COUNT of DESTINATION HOSTS is HIGH 
And the COUNT of SERVICE Ports observed is LOW 
Then Service Scan is HIGH and Network Scan is HIGH 
A Host Scan 
If the COUNT of UNUSUAL SDPs is HIGH 
And the COUNT of DESTINATION HOSTS is LOW 
And the COUNT of SERVICE Ports is HIGH 
Then Host Scan is HIGH. 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the representation of fuzzy rules for detecting TCP 
host, network, and service scans respectively. Each fuzzy system is assumed to have five 
member functions, each with a triangular distribution. For simplicity, we assume that the 
extents of each rule lie at the center point of the adjacent rule. This assures of complete 
coverage in the input domain. The input domain is clipped at the minimum of the 
leftmost and maximum of the rightmost rules so extremely high or low values will still lie 
within the rule domain. 
The next step is to enumerate the fuzzy sets for each type of scan. The fuzzy c-
means algorithm was applied to the data gathered during the two-week observation 
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period prior to running the attacks. Table 7 shows the values for rule center and extents 
obtained using the fuzzy c-means algorithm. These values are used to quantify the rules 
in figures 8, 9, and 10. The resulting membership functions for number of destination 
hosts, number of service ports observed, and number of unique SDPs are shown in 
Figures 11, 12, and 13, respectively. 
Figure 8. Fuzzy system for detecting a host scan. The inputs are the number of unique 
SDPs observed, the number of ports observed, and the number of destinations observed. 
The output is the host scan alert level. 
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Figure 9. Fuzzy system for detecting a network scan. The inputs are the number of 
destination IP addresses observed and the number of SDPs observed. The output is the 
network scan alert level 
Table 7. Rule centers for fuzzy sets obtained by fuzzy c-means clustering for three 
network metrics 
Cluster Number Number of Number of service Number of unique 
destination hosts ports observed SDPs 
1 19.6 15.8 6.6 
2 41.9 23.3 12.3 
3 99.1 26.4 17.0 
4 156.9 68.1 60.7 
5 193.0 90.1 155.8 
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Figure 10. Fuzzy system for detecting a service scan. The inputs are the number of 
unique SDPs observed, and the number of ports observed. The output is the service scan 
alert level. 
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Figure 11. Membership function for number of destinations observed after applying 
fuzzy C-means clustering to observed data. 
Figure 12. Membership function for number of service ports observed after applying 
fuzzy C-means clustering to observed data. 
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Figure 13. Membership functions for number of unique SDPs observed after applying 
fuzzy C-means clustering to observed data. 
Results 
The data collected during the attacks were input to the fuzzy systems for detecting 
host, network, and service scans. In each case, the fuzzy system issued a HIGH alert 
value between 0.9 and 1.0. This shows that typical intruder scanning activity can be 
recognized by these fuzzy detection systems. However, when the data collected in the 
two weeks prior to running the attacks was entered into the fuzzy systems, quite a few 
non-attack collection periods also triggered high alert levels. There were 2012 ten-
minute collection periods recorded in two weeks of data gathering. Of these, 16 periods 
would have issued an alert level between 0.85 and 0.92, indicating moderately high to 
high levels of alert for these scans. Upon further investigation, it was determined that 7 
of these data collection periods appeared to have some type of "in the wild" scanning 
occurring. The remaining 9 data collection periods had high enough SDP counts to 
trigger the detection scenarios. The primary cause of these false alarms is that the 
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membership functions at the edges of the fuzzy sets need to perform better discrimination 
between a HIGH and VERY-HIGH input values, though it is also possible to manually 
adjust the fuzzy sets to that high normal activity does not trigger a HIGH system alert. 
Scenario 2: An Portmapper Scan 
TCP port 111 is well known to network intruders. It is the service port used by 
the Sun RPC port mapper program. A number of attacks are designed to be run against 
services that register RPC programs with the port mapper. Consequently, when an 
intruder is searching for a vulnerable system, they will frequently seek out hosts running 
a port mapper program, then query the program to see what RPC services are installed. 
To detect a port mapper probe, we need to look for unusual connections to port 111. If 
multiple connections from the same intruder host were made within a short period of 
time, this would indicate that the intruder was attempting to gather RPC service 
information. A typical rule for such a probe would be written as: 
If count of UNIQUE SDPs on Port 111 is HIGH 
And COUNT of Foreign SDPs on Port 111 is HIGH 
Then PortMapper Probe is HIGH 
To test the complete set of rules, a portmap scan against port 111 was launched 
against a portion of the systems on the test network. 
Scenario 3: A UDP Buffer Overflow Attack 
Buffer overflow exploits against UDP-based services are highly prized by 
attackers for two main reasons: 1) UDP traffic can be easily spoofed. The attacker can 
easily hide the origination point of the attack packet and it is not necessary for the 
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attacker to ever receive anything back directly from the target. 2) A single, well-crafted 
packet that exploits a buffer overflow is frequently all that is needed in order to penetrate 
a system. 
Unlike TCP-based port scanning, it is not always possible for an intruder to tell 
when a potential target is listening on a given UDP port. The only method an attacker 
has of telling whether a UDP port is open is by checking for ICMP "port unreachable" 
responses. However, these responses are unreliable and the UDP scanning process 
considerable time to scan a whole network. Rather than waste time on a UDP port scan, 
an attacker will often skip the scanning phase and simply bombard a network with UDP 
packets that contain a buffer overflow payload against a particular service. We surmise 
that it is possible to detect a "shotgun" UDP buffer overflow attack by measuring the 
number of unique SDPs seen against a particular UDP service port. 
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a buffer overflow attack against domain 
name servers on the 129.186.5 subnet using the ADM Worm attack. A plot of UDP 
SDPs for the two-week collection period that includes this attack is shown in Figure 14. 
While we can plainly see existence of this attack in the plot, we can also see many other 
types of UDP scans occurring on the network. Ideally, we would like to have additional 
discriminators that would help isolate the buffer overflow attacks. 
If we consider that we are only concerned about attacks on services that are 
actually in use on the network, then we can exclude UDP traffic against services that are 
not in use. Likewise, if we assume that only one service port is being attacked, then the 
number of observed ports in use during an interval would not be unusual. 
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Therefore, we can write the essential firing rule for identifying a UDP buffer 
overflow attack as: 
IF (COUNT of UNIQUE SDPs is HIGH) and 
( COUNT of UDP Ports observed is MEDIUM) then 
(UDP ATTACK alert is HIGH) 
Figure 14. A two week summary of UDP data. Time progresses from left to right along 
the graph. The vertical column contains a histogram of UDP service ports. Each point 
represents a UDP connection between two hosts on particular service port. Regularly 
occurring connections appear as horizontal bands of connections. 
The plot in figure 14 shows some interesting features. We see that regularly 
occurring connections appear as solid bands in the horizontal direction. The ADM Worm 
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attack shows up as a faint band in the vertical direction in the middle of the plot. This 
suggests that a large number of UDP SDPs against a specific port in a short period of 
time may indicate some sort of buffer overflow attack. Since we are not recording packet 
contents, we don't actually know whether the attack is specifically a buffer overflow 
attack. Nonetheless, we can assume that a such an attack is likely and issue an alert 
accordingly. 
It is also interesting to note the roughly diagonal series of points along the middle 
of the graph. This indicates a type of UDP port hopping between two hosts on the 
network, which is a very surprising phenomenon to observe. Looking at this visually 
reveals features that would be difficult to identify using a non-visual approach. 
Scenario 4: A Ping Flood Attack 
A ping flood is a common denial of service attack in which an attacking system 
sends spurious echo reply requests to many hosts on a network causing them to emit a 
large number of echo replies. This attack causes a network to slow down because of 
network congestion. We can observe this type of attack quite easily if we simply keep 
track of the source and destination of echo reply requests. In general, ICMP traffic on a 
network is very predictable as machines will often use ICMP mechanisms to ping servers 
or time synchronization services during the course of normal operations. If we plot 
ICMP traffic over a two week period we see the results in Figure 15. In the scatterplot, 
time is shown on the right axis, packet count is in the vertical and ICMP SDTs are shown 
along the left axis. Additionally, we can use a different color or symbol for different 
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ICMP packet types. The scatterplot shows that there are several regularly occurring 
ICMP communications between regular hosts on the network. 
To see whether we could detect a ping flood, we launched ping flood attack 
against a range oflP addresses from 129.186.5.1 to 129.186.5.253. We used the 
pingflood tool obtained from the Rootshell site (www.rootshell.com). The results of the 
pingflood show up on a plot as a band of points running parallel to the SDT axis. We can 
also see that echo reply requests as a whole are somewhat uncommon. 
This plot suggests that it should be relatively easy to construct fuzzy rules for 
detecting a ping flood attack. Essentially, if the number of ICMP echo reply requests is 
large and there are also a large number of unusual SDTs observed, then a ping flood must 
be occurring. This assumption is reasonable since ICMP packets are generally observed 
Figure 15. A 3-D plot of two weeks oflCMP traffic. Each point represents an ICMP 
connection between two hosts during an observation period. The solid vertical bands are 
regularly recurring ICMP connections on the network. A pingflood attack shows up as a 
horizontal band of points along the bottom of the graph. 
57 
between very specific combinations of machines. A sudden, large increase in the 
number of unique source/destination host combinations would be highly suspicious. It is 
important to observe in Figure 15 that simply observing a large number of ICMP echo 
reply requests was not particularly unusual, as there are several protocols that employ a 
large number of ICMP echo replies to verify that other allied hosts are still reachable on 
the network. Therefore it is necessary to qualify the rule with simultaneous occurrence of 
a larger number of unusual SDTs. A critical rule for detecting a ping flood, then, would 
be: 
IF COUNT of UNUSUAL SDTs is HIGH 
AND COUNT of ICMP ERQs is HIGH 
THEN pingflood ALERT is HIGH 
Scenario 5: Detecting an Unauthorized Server 
In the final stage of an attack, an intruder seeks to take control of a system 
resource or to disclose private information. A common break-in scenario involves an 
intruder installing a rogue server, such as FTP or HTTP, through which other intruders 
may gain access. Frequently, these rogue servers are installed on uncommon ports, or 
perhaps on a port used for another service. In either case, intruders will often use 
encrypted channels to help avoid detection. 
In this detection scenario, a server is considered to be any host that successfully 
completes a TCP 3-way handshake from another host. The servid aggregate key, 
composed of the server IP and the service port, represents the server. The servid comes 
into existence whenever a connection is made to the server host. 
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Since most machines on a network are usually client computers of some sort, we 
would expect that TCP connections to servers on the network would constitute a small 
portion of the overall traffic. Likewise, we would expect that new legitimate servers 
would be added to a network infrequently. Figure 16 shows a scatterplot of TCP activity 
over a two-week window where time is depicted on the lower right axis, a histogram of 
server IDs occupies the lower left axis, and the number of connections is on the axis 
perpendicular to the other two. From this plot, we see that the network is a pretty 
complicated mixture of data streams. In figure 17, we strip out all data connections 
except for those in which a proper TCP connection was observed. The result is 
somewhat startling. Now, we can plainly which servers are actually being connected to 
on the network. Also, it is fairly easy to discern regularly occurring servers as bands of 
points that run parallel to the time axis. However, it is not readily apparent on this graph 
when a new or unique server appears. But if the data points are further color coded 
according to a measure of the uniqueness of that server ID, then it should become 
apparent when a new server appears. 
From the graphs, we can conclude that the metrics for number of unique servers 
observed during an interval, and the uniqueness of those servers would both be good 
metrics from which to develop rules for detecting unauthorized servers on a network. If 
we assume that we are more sensitive to connections from outside the network, then we 
can modify the rule so that connections from outside the domain cause the severity of the 
alert to increase. We can write a representative rule for this scenario as: 
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IF COUNT of UNIQUE SERVERS is MEDIUM HIGH 
And UNIQUENESS of SERVERS is HIGH 
And UNIQUE FOREIGN SDPs is MEDIUM HIGH 
THEN Unauthorized Server Alert is HIGH 
The full set of fuzzy rules for this detection scenario is shown in Figure 18. We 
use the two-week observation period to create the rule centers. We found that two of the 
metrics used in the rule set, count of unique servers and uniqueness of servers, were 
essentially zero for most of the observation period, so we applied a statistical mean to 
determine the member function quantities. 
Figure 17. A two-week summary of TCP port activity showing only those connections in 
which an actual TCP 3-way handshake was observed. Time progresses from left to right. 
The vertical axis is a histogram of service ports. Only ports below 5000 are shown. 
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To test this hypothesis, we installed an SSH server on an uncommon port (port 
789) then successfully connected to the server from several hosts both from within the 
local subnet of the host and from an external network. We plotted the results as shown in 
figure 17. This time, we applied a color scheme to each data point according the 
frequency of appearance of that server id. The rogue server that we installed clearly 
shows up in the plot. However, the plot also shows a high incidence of unique servers 
that were not part of the test. Out of 2012 collection intervals, 11 separate intervals 
contained MEDIUM-HIGH to HIGH values for the number of unique servers ( 2 or 3 
unique server connections). Although it was difficult to verify the circumstance of every 
one of these higher values, it was determined through further inspection that at least 4 
connections in addition to the staged attack were the result of unauthorzed connections. 
However, this also meant that there were potentially up to 6 false alarms, or 
approximately an 55 percent false alarm rate. This can be attributed to the fuzzy C-
means clustering of the input data with sparsely distributed values for the number of 
unique servers. In this case, it is clear that adjusting the fuzzy membership functions 
manually or using a statistical mean-based fuzzy set quantifier would reduce the number 
of false positives in this result. 
When we applied this fuzzy system to the data gathered when we installed the 
rogue server, we found that the rogue test server triggered the HIGH alert for 
Unauthorized Servers. To facilitate detection, it may be a good idea for the system to 
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maintain a list of known legitimate known servers and exclude them from detection 
processing. However, the unauthorized server detection algorithm should not be 
impaired by not having such a list. Rather, the list would be helpful at focusing the 
detection on unknown servers, possibly reducing the number of false alarms. 
Figure 16. A two-week summary of on all TCP service ports. The time axis increases 
from left to right. The vertical axis is a histogram of TCP service ports. For clarity, only 
ports below 5000 are shown. 
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Figure 18. Fuzzy system for detecting unauthorized server use. The inputs are the number 
of unique servers observed and the number of unique SDPs for a given port. The output is 
the degree of alert for an unauthorized server. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that anomaly-based network intrusion detection can be a complex 
process. The shear variety in the network data stream, the amount of data to be 
processed, and the subtle and ever-changing ways that intruders penetrate systems all 
conspire to complicate the process. Nonetheless, this research has shown that there are 
several broad classes of intrusion behavior that can be detected with a general anomaly 
based approach. The metrics we have selected for this phase of the proof of concept will 
easily enable detection of various scan and flood activity. More specialized metrics, 
such as server connection activity, and incidence of various service ports on the network 
make it possible to observe more specific attacks. While this research does not solve the 
problem of finding all network-based invasions, we feel that the generality of fuzzy 
intrusion detection may hold great promise as a high-level intrusion detection scheme that 
works in conjunction with detailed misuse detection systems. Most importantly, this 
research has laid a solid groundwork for fuzzy intrusion detection and revealed promising 
areas of continued exploration. 
The Denning intrusion detection model provides a sound theoretical basis for the 
discussion of the science. We have found that it is possible to produce a practical 
intrusion detection system that remains true to the overall framework of the Denning 
model. As Denning makes clear, the ultimate performance of the system depends greatly 
on the choice of data elements. Great care has been given to the selection of metrics and 
for techniques to store the data efficiently. Visual data mining has proven to be a valuable 
tool in helping understand the data being collected and what metrics are the most 
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important to the intrusion detection scenarios at hand. Data aggregation and data 
reduction techniques have proved particularly important in exposing the most sensitive 
features in the input stream. 
The fuzzy systems approach to the pattern matching aspect of the system has 
shown itself to be versatile and flexible. Fuzzy rules can be written for very general 
conditions in the data, or for very specific items. Also, the fuzzy systems can be made 
adaptive to the point that the security administrator does not need to set arbitrary 
thresholds for alert conditions. Rather, the geometry of the fuzzy member functions can 
obtained directly from the data. 
While this research has proven very enlightening about the difficulties and 
challenges of anomaly-based intrusion detection, there are several areas that we will 
continue to explore as we endeavor to create a deployable system for FIRE. A short list 
of planned enhancements are listed below: 
1. Continue to investigate different detection scenarios and the metrics necessary 
for detecting them. 
2. Integrate the method for updating fuzzy membership function constraints 
directly into the plotter program instead of performing the analysis with 
Matlab. 
3. Devise metrics for time signature characteristics in network packet data. 
Currently the ndump program ignores the length (in time) of a connection or 
the time between messages. 
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4. Develop host-based processing capabilities including login behavior and email 
activity. 
5. Create a stateful processing capability for ICMP packets. Currently, ndump 
does not logically connect echo reply requests with echo replies. 
6. Improve the handling of long-lived connections. There are several 
improvements planned to the strategy for identifying long-lived connections 
and properly tracking the TCP state of those connections. 
In summary, we feel that this research shows that fuzzy intrusion detection can be 
deployed in a practical sense to help make the security operator more aware of the 
activity on a network. Visual data mining for intrusion detection is a new area that 
promises exciting new opportunities for increasing the security of computer systems. 
Together, fuzzy intrusion detection and visual data mining can provide powerful analysis 
capabilities to the security administrator. 
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